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words to all suspects." 459 U.S. at 564, n.
15. Since the officer's inquiry was not
designed to elicit testimonial evidence
from McAvoy, again no Miranda advice
was required.
The right that McAvoy did possess, and
which was not infringed, was the right not
to be unreasonably refused counsel if
requested. In addressing McAvoy's contentions in this regard, the court of appeals
relied on Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481
A.2d 192 (1984), which holds that "a person under detention for drunk driving
must, on request, be permitted a reasonable
opportunity to communicate with counsel
before submitting to a chemical sobriety
test ... " Id. 300 Md. at 717-18,481 A.2d at
192 (emphasis added). However, the right
to counsel is limited only to circumstances
that "will not substantially interfere with
the timely and efficacious administration
of the testing process." Id. Since McAvoy
had neither requested counsel nor been
formally charged with a crime, the court
found that his Sixth Amendment rights
were also not violated.
By holding that a suspect is not entitled
to Miranda advice prior to either a field or
chemical sobriety test, the court of appeals
has merely adopted the prevailing law set
forth by the Supreme Court jn its
decisions of Berkemer and Neville. The
decision still insures that a suspect will not
be deprived of counsel if requested. However, the court is further guaranteeing that
persons who drive while intoxicated will
nonetheless be accountable for such
imprudent acts.

- Timothy Mitchell
Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio: "EARLY
BIRD" EMPLOYEE NOT ELIGIBLE

FOR WORKERS' COMPENSAnON
UNDER TIlE COMING AND
GOING RULE
In Fatrchild Space Co. v. Baroffio, 77 Md.
App.494, 551 A.2d 135 (1989), the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
an "early bird" employee who was told by
her supervisor to report to work early was
not eligible for workers' compensation for
injuries sustained on her way to work. As
a result, the court limited the application
of the "dual purpose" and "special errand
or mission" exceptions under the "coming
and going" rule.
Susan Baroffio, the appellee, was an
Associate Contract Administrator for
Fairchild Space Company, the appellant.
Her duties sometimes required her to
work overtime without pay. On Friday,
September 5, 1986, she was told by her
supervisor to arrive at work one-half hour

early on Monday to prepare a presentation. In preparation for the presentation,
the appellee worked late on Friday, returned to work on Saturday and worked at
home on Sunday evening. On Monday,
Ms. Baroffio left for work one-half hour
earlier than normal by her usual route and
was injured in a car accident.
Ms. Baroffio filed a claim for compensation with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission
made an "Award of Compensation"
which Fairchild appealed to the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, which
affirmed the Commission's award. Fairchild then appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland where both parties
agreed to proceed on an expedited appeal
and an agreed statement of facts.
To begin its analysis, the court examined
the language of the "coming and going"
rule. The court noted that while the
Workers' Compensation Act was designed
to provide compensation for work-related
injuries, injuries sustained while traveling
to or from the work place are not covered.
Id. at 497,551 A.2d at 136, (citing, Gilbert
& Humphreys, Maryland Workers' Com·
pensation Handbook, §6.6 (1988». There
are, however, two applicable exceptions to
this rule which allow an injured employee
to receive compensation for injuries sustained while coming and going to the
work place.
The court first applied the "dual purpose" exception which states:
Injury during a trip which serves both
a business and a personal purpose is
within the course of employment if
the trip involves the performance of a
service for the employer which would
have caused the trip to be taken by
someone even if it had not coincided
with the personal i n j u r y . ,
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
§ 18.00 (1965). If an employee chooses to
work at home for her convenience, coming and going to work is not for a business
purpose within the exception. Id., § 18.33
at 4-316. Based upon this, the court found
no evidence that Ms. Baroffio was required
to work at home, rather, it was a matter of
her personal preference, and concluded
that her injuries did not fall within the
dual purpose exception.
In support of this conclusion, the court
found Stoskin v. Board of Educ. of Mont·
gomery County, 11 Md. App. 335, 274 A.2d
397 (1971) to be directly on point.) In
Stoskin, a school teacher who was told by
the principal to study certain books prior
to the first day of school, attempted to rely
on the "dual purpose" exception after
being injured on her way to work. Even
though the teacher was in the course of her
employment when reviewing the books,

the court found no evidence that she was
required to work at home. The Stoskin
court found the "dual purpose" exception
inapplicable because the teacher's review
ended before she began her trip to work
the following day.
The court next proceeded to address the
appellee's primary argument, that her
injury was compensable under the "special
errand or mission" exception. This exception provides:
When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his
employment, makes an off-premises
journey which would normally not be
covered under the usual going and
coming rule, the journey may be
brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and
time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency
of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part
of the service itself.
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation lAw, §
16.11 (1985). The court rejected this exception, and noted that the exception usually
applies to employees who are regularly
"on call" and are subsequently injured on
their way to work. Fairchild, 77 Md. App.
at 500, 551 A.2d at 139. The court of special appeals reiterated its finding in Coats &
Clark's Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md. App.
10, 13, 383 A.2d 67, 70 (1978) that "the
essential characteristic of a special errand
or mission is that it would not have been
undertaken except for the obligation of
employment."
The court also found Trent v. Collin S.
Tuttle & Co., 20 A.D.2d 948, 249 N.Y.S. 2d
140 (1964) persuasive in its rejection of the
special errand exception. In Trent, an executive secretary who was required to turn
in a report early the next day, worked late
and completed the report at home. She left
early the following morning and was
injured on her way to work. The New
York court rejected her argument that the
"special errand" exception applied. That
court held that travel to and from work is
not a risk of employment unless the
employee's home is really a second
employment location where services are
required to be rendered. Fairchild, 77 Md.
App. at 502, 551 A.2d at 139.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland applied the New York court's
rationale and found that Fairchild did not
require Ms. Baroffio to work at home and
that the "special errand or mission" exception to the "coming and going" rule did
not apply. In so holding, the court has
declined to expand workers' compensation
laws to include an employee who is
required to report to work early.

- Michael P. Sawicki
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